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Abstract:  Reber’s theory of the cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) is right to emphasize that 
we should study consciousness (sentience) in its simplest form, taking its evolution into account. 
However, not enough evidence is presented to support CBC’s unorthodox claim that even 
simple, one-celled organisms are conscious. As pointed out by other commentators, the CBC 
seems to be based on outdated ideas about evolution and does not acknowledge that 
consciousness could be an evolutionary novel feature. Such emergent features are abundant in 
living organisms. We review our own emergentist solution, in which consciousness evolved in the 
elaborating nervous systems of the first vertebrates and arthropods.  
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This commentary discusses Reber’s (2016a) original target article about his theory of the cellular 
basis of consciousness (CBC) as well as the commentaries and the author’s responses to them 
(Reber, 2016b, 2017) that have appeared so far. The CBC theory says consciousness is not a 
product of nervous systems (contrary to the standard view), but is a basic feature of life and 
accompanies even the simplest life forms such as bacteria.  
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We understand what Reber was striving to do with this theory: to reduce the baffling 
hard problem of consciousness to an easier problem that can be investigated empirically with 
known, scientific techniques. This easier problem would be to find the biochemical mechanisms 
that give bacteria sensitivity to outside stimuli and let them approach or recoil upon 
“experiencing” a stimulus as good or bad. Several of the other commentators (Ball, 2016; Brakel, 
2016; Broude, 2016; Woodruff, 2016) questioned this strategy, but we feel the author explained 
and defended it well as a mechanistic rebuttal of dualism (Reber, 2016b, p. 5; 2017, p. 3). We 
also like his refutation of panpsychic theories of consciousness: “if sentience is everywhere it 
might as well be nowhere for it will be impossible to ascertain either existence or nonexistence” 
(2016b, p. 3). Like some of the other commentators, we laud his evolution-centered, bottom-up 
approach (Ball, 2016; Morsella & Reyes, 2016; Ristau, 2016) as an important counterbalance to 
the great majority of consciousness studies that only investigate the human cerebral cortex 
(e.g., Gutfreund, 2017).  
 Our problem, however, is with CBC’s basic claim that one-celled organisms with no 
nervous system are conscious. Too little evidence is given to support such an iconoclastic claim. 
One might say that some evidence was presented, this evidence being that even the simplest 
life-forms respond and react to stimuli. But this is not enough because nonconscious neural 
reflexes demonstrably do these same things, despite being more complex than bacteria (also 
see the commentaries of Morsella & Reyes, 2016, and Safina, 2016). In science, extraordinary 
claims — like bacterial consciousness — require extraordinary evidence, meaning abundant 
evidence systematically applied (Sagan, 1980). It is not valid to present the claim as an axiom 
and then deem it correct because it seems to fit evolutionary principles and seems to give better 
solutions to thorny philosophical problems (e.g., to the difficulties of the hard problem and the 
“Emergentist’s Dilemma”).  
Skipping the primary evidence is especially inappropriate here because much is known 
about how bacteria receive and respond to stimuli. But Reber did not cite a single study on this, 
neither in 1997 when first proposing the CBC, nor two decades later in his 2016 paper, by which 
time the relevant information had grown markedly (Reber, 1997, 2016a). In fact, commentators 
Woodruff (2016) and Safina (2016) had to introduce this literature. Once its richness became 
evident to us, we easily found more of it: see Booth (2014); Brohawn et al. (2014); and Sourjik & 
Wingreen (2012). Assuming an axiom without having considered the available evidence is not 
how science is done. Safina squarely criticized this no-evidence approach, and Reber’s (2017) 
dismissal in response is discouraging: “I am not a molecular biologist and have no solution to the 
question of how subjectivity is created in single-cell organisms. I merely claim that it is so 
created.” No, the burden of proof is on Reber as the claimant to find and master the scientific 
literature pertaining to his claim. Even philosophers can read science papers or consult a 
scientist.    
We agree with most of the criticisms in the commentary by Key (2016), who shares the 
standard view that consciousness needs a nervous system.1 To us, it really does seem that Reber 
is claiming that this standard, neural-computational, view makes consciousness too difficult to 
understand, so his approach is needed because it is easier (“far more tractable”: 2016a, pp. 7-8). 
On the contrary, as Key points out, if a problem is difficult and the answer is currently unknown, 
it does not follow that it is unsolvable or that current modes of inquiry have met a dead end. 
More on this below.  
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 Second, as Key indicates, the evolutionary principles used to build the CBC do not seem 
correct. These principles appear to presuppose that evolution proceeds in a straight line from 
simple to complex as if directed up a pyramid.2 Some of them seem to precede the “modern 
evolutionary synthesis” of the 1930s and 1940s. An entry in the literature on current 
evolutionary ideas is provided by Laland et al. (2014).  
 Third, Key points out that important new features evolve in biological lineages over time 
(fins in fish, milk in mammals, and many more: Peterson & Muller, 2016); Reber’s target article 
does not show an appreciation of this. Key’s implication is that consciousness could easily be 
one of these evolutionary innovations. Then Broude (2016) states this point explicitly. We view 
Key’s and Broude’s criticism of Reber’s target article as correct, because Reber says little about 
novelty but instead states that the core or rudimentary aspects of later-evolved features are 
there from the start and “what gets added isn’t ontologically novel; it’s a gradual accretion of 
functions” (Reber, 2016a, pp. 4-5). Consciousness as an evolutionary novelty would be 
absolutely devastating to Reber’s theory, according to which it would have to have been present 
from the start of life. Reber’s reply to the no-novelty criticism is odd: he states that he does 
allow evolutionary novelty, as exemplified by his former theory about the unconscious (?) 
(2016b, p. 4); and he admits that pre-existing consciousness evolved new features to become 
more complex (2017, p. 3). But he never allows that consciousness itself is a novelty, so he does 
not address the criticism.  
 As stated above, Reber objects to the standard theory that consciousness requires a 
nervous system because he feels that theory leads to thorny difficulties. More important, he 
objects because the standard theory seems to demand an impossible origin for consciousness: 
“It requires that at some moment in evolutionary history a capacity for subjective 
representation blinked into ontogenetic reality whereas one cosmic moment before no species 
possessed it” (2016b, p. 4; 2016a, p. 7). He calls this impossibility the “Emergentist’s Dilemma.”  
But a consideration of the true property of emergence — the emergence that characterizes all 
complex biological systems — eliminates any such problem. In systems theory (Ahl & Allen, 
1996; Salthe, 1985; Simon, 1962, 1973; Feinberg, 2011), life and the biosphere are recognized as 
being arranged hierarchically into many levels of increasing complexity with new properties 
arising (emerging), from lower properties, at each higher level. For example, biomolecules like 
DNA and proteins emerge from simpler molecules and atoms, cell organelles emerge from the 
biomolecules, and the living cell from the organelles. Consciousness is no different in principle, 
emerging anew from high levels of neural processing.3 The new, emergent properties all arose 
over evolutionary time and none are unexplainable miracles.     
 The emergent property of life itself, which was considered a mystery and a miracle 
throughout most of human history, is especially informative about consciousness. If Reber (and 
Velmans, 2016) were to apply their non-emergent arguments to life, they would have to say life 
could not have evolved step-by-step because it could not have blinked into existence 
instantaneously from a nonliving entity. They would accordingly have to conclude that life is 
inherent in lower levels of organization, which here would mean life is in DNA or even in atoms.   
But this reasoning leads to a strange animism (living molecules!) that no modern scientist would 
accept, so it is dubious. Our point is that consciousness is an emergent feature of complex 
hierarchical systems, as is life. Scientists just understand more of the steps in the evolution of 
life than in the evolution of consciousness, so the latter seems a mystery. That is, we say life is 
Animal Sentience 2017.012:  Mallatt & Feinberg on Reber on Origins of Mind 
 
 4 
on the “it’s difficult but we can solve it” side of a line and consciousness is on the “it’s so difficult 
that it’s hard even to even see how to solve it” side of the same line. If this is the correct way to 
view things, then the rapidly growing body of neurobiological knowledge bodes well for solving 
more difficulties of consciousness in the future. Despite science’s still-incomplete understanding 
of life and how it evolved (Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2014), life is not considered a mystery; so, by 
analogy, consciousness should not be either.  
 Our own theory of the origin of consciousness is called neurobiological naturalism. In 
constructing this theory, we pondered which set of neural features led to the emergence of 
consciousness (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a, 2016b) and then deduced that it originated in the 
first vertebrate fish and the first arthropods between 560 and 520 million years ago in the 
Cambrian Period. Fossil evidence from this age documents the rapid evolutionary elaboration of 
sensory organs, nervous systems, behaviors, and indirectly, cognition (Carbone & Narbonne, 
2014; Erwin & Valentine, 2013; Trestman, 2013). In our emergentist approach to the evolution 
of consciousness during that time, we related consciousness to the first appearance in brains of 
mapped, mental simulations of the world and of the first affects (“emotions”), all of which 
helped the conscious animals to target their interactions with the world. There is much more to 
this argument, so the reader is directed to our publications and to the similar theory of Klein 
and Barron (2016). We do not know exactly how long it took for vertebrates and arthropods to 
go from nonconscious to conscious in the Cambrian (several million years?), just as no one 
knows exactly how long it took for life to evolve from non-life almost four billion years ago. 
However, we are confident that both consciousness and life — and all the myriad emergent 
properties of living systems — evolved continuously and without any breaks that demand 
miracles to fill.  
We recognize three emergent revolutions in the continuous path from matter to 
consciousness. First was the evolution of life itself, with all of life’s attendant, uniquely biological 
features (Mayr, 2004). Second, about 580 million years ago some Precambrian animals evolved 
nervous systems with reflexes, which allowed unique and even complex neural processing but 
did not require consciousness. Third, in the Cambrian, came consciousness when complex brains 
with multi-level, reciprocally arranged neural hierarchies and specialized neurons allowed the 
emergence of conscious mapped images and affects (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013, 2016a, 2016b). 
 In summary, we used an evidence-based argument to reach a conclusion different from 
the CBC. Consciousness is not inherent in life but an emergent property of complex nervous 





1We do not agree, however, with Key’s view that consciousness needs a cerebral cortex as in mammals.  
2Reber’s principles seem to contain claims with which today’s evolutionary biologists would disagree: “Mutations . . 
. tend to occur in the upper layers [i.e., in later-evolving features] not in the core, foundational form [in features 
that evolved earlier]” (2016b, p. 4); and “Adaptive forms and functions are not jettisoned [i.e., no traits are ever 
lost throughout evolutionary history]” (2016a, p. 4).    
3Because we have demanded that claims be supported by evidence, here are two pieces of evidence that 
consciousness is an emergent property of complex nervous systems: (1) the brain is more complex than a cell; (2) 
damage to the human cerebral cortex interferes with consciousness (Feinberg, 2009).     
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